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Introduction
At the heart of institutional and governance debates on EU Cohesion policy is the
argument that Structural Funds have increased the profile and influence of regional
and local actors in economic development. As Benz and Eberlein (1999, page 335) note,
since the landmark reforms of the Structural Funds in 1988, the Funds have been
widely studied as a paradigm case of multilevel governance structures in the EU15
and of adjustment of regional structures (Bo« rzel, 1999; Heinelt and Smith, 1996;
Hooghe, 1996; Hooghe and Marks, 2001). Based on the preaccession and postaccession
experience of the new member states, it has been suggested that EU Cohesion policy will
similarly lead to changes in territorial relations within Central and Eastern European
countries (Grabbe, 2003; Keating, 2003). Specifically, it is anticipated that Structural and
Cohesion Funds will promote the greater involvement of regional-level institutions in
economic development, with the potential for wider changes in regional governance
structures and policy practice (Ferry, 2003a; Hooghe, 1996).
Recent policy developments would appear to support this thesis. In the run-up to
EU accession, the Phare programme was used to provide direct support for subnational
institutions in the new member states to assist them to prepare for Structural Funds.
During the first Structural Funds programme period (2004 ^ 06) several accession
countries implemented joint Regional Operational Programmes (ROPs), with the prospect
of further decentralisation of programme management and delivery responsibilities in the
2007 ^ 13 period. As under the regulatory reforms of 1988, 1993, and 1999, the 2006
European Council regulations governing EU Cohesion policy for 2007 ^ 13 emphasise
the importance of involving regional and local authorities in the design and delivery
of Structural Funds programmes (Council of the European Union, 2006). Indeed, the
European Commission has argued that the Cohesion policy goal (of promoting growth,
jobs, and competitiveness) in the 2007 ^ 13 period `` will only work if it is owned by all
stakeholdersöat EU, national, regional and local levels'' (Hu« bner, 2006, page 2).
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Abstract. This paper undertakes a critical assessment of the influence of the EU Cohesion policy on
regionalisation and the role of regional institutions in Central and Eastern Europe. It addresses
questions that are central to ongoing theoretical debates about the role of the region in the new
member states. Have the powers and resources of the regions been strengthened by their involvement
in EU support programmes? Are regions increasingly involved in integrated `bottom-up' responses to
regional development challenges? The paper offers a fresh perspective on these issues, with a cross-
national analysis of practical experience in the postenlargement period and a detailed assessment of the
technical, variable, and complex reality of working with EU Structural Funds. A distinctive approach of
the analysis is to disaggregate the stages of Structural Funds programme management and delivery,
thereby highlighting the varied nature of regional involvement in Structural Funds. Ultimately, the paper
questions the notion that Structural Funds build regional structures and competence, and lead to `stronger
regions'. Instead, it is argued that there is no guarantee that the Structural Funds will necessarily promote
regionalisation in Central and Eastern Europe, at least in the short to medium terms.
However, there is a need for caution in making judgments about the regionalisation
of Structural Funds in the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe.(1) The
status of `regions' varies greatly among the EU8 member states, reflecting country size,
administrative structures, and political factors. These differences in territorial and
institutional structures are associated with varying levels of subnational participation
in the management and delivery of Structural Funds programmes.
A further analytical challenge is the Structural Funds implementation process. The
allocation of EU Cohesion policy resources involves complex procedures of regional
development planning, programme management and project delivery, with subnational
bodies potentially having different roles and responsibilities in the decisions at each
stage. As previously noted, the bureaucratic procedures have the potential to
strengthen regional dependence on central government ministries (Slocock, 2003).
Preliminary assessments of the experiences of the 2004 ^ 06 programmes in the EU8
have found considerable variation in the way that different aspects of Structural Funds
implementation are being organised (McMaster and Bachtler, 2005).
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to undertake a critical assessment
of the influence of EU Cohesion policy on regionalisation and the role of regional
institutions in Central and Eastern Europe. It questions the assumption that Structural
Funds will necessarily lead to `stronger regions' by building regional structures and
competenceöat least in the short and medium termsöand that this is a particular
`benefit' of the Funds. In particular, the paper contends that, positioned between strong
central government and well-established municipalities, region-level institutions may
struggle to assert their role.
In order to establish the role of subnational institutions in EU Cohesion policy, this
paper analyses in detail the implementation process through which Structural Funds are
managed and delivered. It examines key stages of Structural Funds implementationö
regional development planning, programme management, programme implementation,
and project implementationöwith the aim of providing an in-depth and realistic
assessment of regional involvement in Cohesion policy.
The paper draws on studies of strategy development and Cohesion policy implementa-
tion in eight new EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe: Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. The studies,
led by the authors of this paper, involved extensive policy and literature reviews and elite
interviews with national and regional-level organisations and actors in each of the EU8
countries, which were undertaken in 2003, 2004, and 2005. A team of researchers con-
ducted semistructured interviews with senior representatives of key government ministries
and agencies, regional and municipal authorities, and local interest groups.
The paper begins by reviewing debates surrounding the participation of regional admini-
strations in Structural Fund programmes, and economic development more generally.
It then outlines the key stages in Structural Funds development and implementation,
and it assesses the planned, actual, and future inputs of regional institutions in the selected
countries. By examining the various stages of Structural Funds implementation and prac-
tical experience across countries, we conclude that there is no guarantee that the Structural
Funds will necessarily promote regionalisation or the role of regional authorities.
Regionalism and Structural Funds in the EU8 member states
The EUöand particularly EU Cohesion policyöis widely credited with exercising a
strong influence on the evolution of regional-level structures and systems, as part of the
(1) In this paper the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe, which joined the EU
in 2004öthe Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic,
Sloveniaöare generally referred to as the `EU8 member states'.
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design and implementation of regional development policies in the member states. Bache
(1999), Bo« rzel (1999), and Marks et al (1996a) suggest that the implementation of the
Structural Funds has stimulated the creation of regional-level frameworks and institu-
tions and has boosted regions' ability to steer economic development processes. Since
the reform of the Structural Funds in 1988, EU Cohesion policy has involved a model
of regional development based on: a concentration of resources on the poorest coun-
tries and regions; the allocation of funding through regionalised, strategic, multiannual
programmes; the principle of subsidiarity, requiring decisions to be taken as close to
the citizen as possible; and the principle of partnership, requiring the involvement of
regional institutions and actors in negotiating development programmes and in imple-
menting programmes and projects (Hooghe, 1996; Keating, 1995). Some authors have
even suggested that the multilevel character of the EU has empowered subnational
levels at the expense of the nation-state, which has had to accept a significant loss of
control (Blom-Hansen, 2005; Marks et al, 1996b, page 346).
According to the governance literature, the influence of the Structural Funds has
been twofold. First, it has contributed to a change in the structures of territorial
administration (Coyle, 1997; Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003; Kleyn and Bekker, 1997;
Svensson and Oë sthol, 2001). Based on the subsidiarity principle, Structural Funds
management responsibilities have been devolved to lower levels of government (eg Italy,
United Kingdom) or to deconcentrated offices of the state (eg France, Sweden) (Ferry,
2003a). Structural Funds are attributed with stimulating the development of new
institutional frameworks at the regional level in Finland (Johansson, 1997) and Ireland.
A second influence of the Structural Funds, revealed by research on the partnership
principle, relates to changes in the territorial relations between organisations and across
levels of government. This concerns the way in which subnational authorities have
become involved in the planning and implementation of Structural Funds programmes
through various forms of consultation or cooperation, thereby increasing the profile
and influence of the regional level (Kelleher et al, 1999), although with major differ-
ences between member states in the regional-level control of power and resources
(Roberts, 2003). Structural Funds have been accorded a key role in mobilising and
supporting regional development institutions and networks, which has helped them to
lead and coordinate bottom-up, integrated responses to economic development chal-
lenges and, more generally, to establish a `fabric' of regional organisations to support
local businesses (Jones, 2001).
These developments are part of a broader trend discussed in the regional studies
literature. Advocates of the `new regionalism' argue that region-specific factors are
fundamental to understanding contemporary patterns and processes of economic and
social activity, and that region-level policies, institutions, and networks are important
for developing and maintaining competitive advantage (Amin, 1999; Morgan, 1997;
Storper, 1997; Storper and Scott, 1995). Related, and paralleling the reforms of the
Structural Funds since 1988, regional development policies in many Western European
countries have moved away from centrally administered aid schemes, targeted on
designated assisted areas, towards regional-level programmes and strategies developed
and implemented by regional bodies (either regional offices of the state or devolved
institutions), as part of wide-ranging changes to the territorial governance of economic
development (Bachtler, 2001; Halkier, 2006).
In the case of the EU8 member states, the influence of the EU on territorial
structures and relations began with the c`onditionality' of EU membership obligations
(Ferry, 2003b). These countries were obliged to meet the requirements of the acquis
communautaire, the entire body of EU legislation. Chapter 21 of the acquis sets out
detailed conditions and rules in the field of `regional policy and the coordination of
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structural instruments', which stresses the importance of establishing an `appropriate'
form of territorial organisation for the implementation of Structural Funds and requires
the adoption of the NUTS statistical classification system (European Commission,
2001).(2) Further, the European Commission was felt to have a clear preference for
the establishment of democratically elected, regional self-governments (Brusis, 1999;
Marek and Baun, 2002; Yoder, 2003).
By controlling the negotiation process and issuing regular reports on progress towards
meeting the accession criteria, the European Commission had a g`ate-keeping' role,
exercising considerable influence over policy development and governance in all the
applicant countries (Grabbe, 2003). Additionally, preaccession EU funding programmes,
Phare, ISPA, and SAPARD,(3) offered direct assistance to the accession countries, by
providing financial resources and technical support for a range of activities, including
institution building (Baun, 2002, page 267). These programmes had a key role in
shaping new institutional frameworks for the development and delivery of EU funds,
and territorial governance (Brusis, 2005). The European Commission (2005) credited
EU programmes with supporting the development of good governance and strengthening
the role of regions in countries such as the Czech Republic, Latvia, and Poland.
With previously limited or nonexistent regional policies, and weak regional economic
development institutions, the accession countries faced a particular challenge in meeting
the Chapter 21 criteria. Regional or provincial levels were generally weak, which left an
a`dministrative vacuum' between the powerful central government ministries and the
numerous, small, and fragmented local government authorities (Bachtler et al, 2000).
Territorial government reforms were often controversial, with bitter political conflict
(Fowler, 2001; Illner, 2002). As the recent decision to delay regional administrative reform
in Latvia indicates, some debates remain unresolved. However, the `push' to fulfil the
acquis was balanced by the `pull' of the opportunities available from EU membership and
participation in EU Cohesion policy programmes (McMaster, 2006). As a result, sub-
stantial regional and institutional reforms were undertaken in the lead-up to EU accession.
However, the degree to which the EU has exerted a powerful influence over regional
institutional developments and regional e`mpowerment', both in old and in new member
states, has been challenged. Several authors argue that the influence of the EU, relative to
the member states, has been exaggerated. Laffan (2004), for example, contends that
national governments continue to be responsible for key decisions on territorial admin-
istrative reforms and regional institutional development. Specifically with respect to the
implementation of EU Cohesion policy, Blom-Hansen (2005, page 648) goes so far as
to state that `` the EU ... appears impotent'', while the member states `` appear to be in
full control''. As the EU does not regulate the structure and status of regional institu-
tions in the member states, domestic policy makers have considerable discretion in
the way the Structural and Cohesion Funds are administered (Hughes et al, 2004;
Marek and Baun, 2002a, 2002b). Experience demonstrates that institutional legacies and
domestic policy preferences lead to variations in the response of domestic actors
and institutions to regional development needs. In the case of regional participation in
(2) The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) was established by Eurostat
to provide a single uniform breakdown of territorial units for the production of regional sta-
tistics for the EU. There are three main levels of regional unit, each with a minimum and
maximum population size: NUTS I (3 ^ 7 million); NUTS II (0.8 ^ 3 million); and NUTS III
(150 000 ^ 800 000). NUTS II is used as the basis for determining regional eligibility for EU
Cohesion policy support under the Objective 1/Convergence objective.
(3) In 2001 Phare had the largest financial allocation, worth approximately 1.6 billion at 2000 prices,
followed by ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession), with 1.1 billion, and
SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development) worth 0.5 billion.
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Structural Funds, some governments have chosen to allow greater regional involvement
than others. Relevant responsibilities may be retained at national level (as in Portugal),
deconcentrated to units of the state in the regions (as in England, Finland, France,
and Sweden), devolved to regions (as in Italy), or operate through fully regionalised
programmes under federal systems (as in Austria, Belgium, and Germany) (Ferry, 2003b).
More generally, the relevance of the `new regionalist' approach has been ques-
tioned, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. Linked to the Europeanisation
literature, critics have argued that the role of the region has been overemphasised,
while the role of the state and external factors in regional economic development are
underestimated (eg Cumbers, 2000; Hudson, 1997; Lovering, 1999). Lovering (1999),
for example, maintains that only those regions fortunate enough to find themselves in a
favourable historical position will possess the cooperative networks and regional
institutional capacity that, contribute to s`uccessful' economic development.
These arguments have a particular resonance in the EU8 member states for several
reasons. Many regions are facing multiple, long-term economic development and
restructuring challenges, with limited institutional and economic resources. The new
regionalist approach assumes a political commitment, capacity, and resources at regional
level, which may not exist. The EU8 countries have long-standing traditions of centralised,
sectoral policy making, while regional institutional capacity is often weak. A further
criticism of both the new regionalist and Europeanisation literatures, which has been
much less widely explored, is that they take generalised perspectives in their analyses of
the `role' of the regions, especially in their assessments of Structural Funds programmes.
The influence of EU Cohesion policy on regionalisation is frequently dealt with in a
superficial way, with an assumption that an ideal `regional' model of Structural Funds
programming will eventually be replicated in the EU8.
In practice, the systems and structures involved in the development and delivery of
EU funds are complex and variable, particularly in terms of the involvement of regions.
First, there are several stages in the programming cycle where regions can be involved
to a greater or lesser extent. Second, plans for regional involvement may be quite
different to what actually happens in practice, as proposals on paper fail to be realised.
Third, there is no single model for Structural Funds implementation. Fourth, regional
programmes are only part of the Structural Funds story in the EU8, as resources are
also allocated through sectorally oriented programmes and national funds.
Against the backdrop of these contested debates, the following sections of this
paper examine the degree to which the implementation of EU Cohesion policy since
2004 has promoted regionalism in the EU8 member states. Taking account of the com-
plexity and diversity of Structural Funds programmes, the paper addresses questions
that are central to theoretical arguments about EU influence on the role of the regions.
To what extent have the powers and resources of the regions been strengthened by their
involvement in EU support programmes? Are regions increasingly involved in `bottom-up'
responses to regional development challenges? The paper offers a fresh perspective on
these questions, with a cross-national analysis of practical experience in the postenlarge-
ment period and a detailed assessment of the technical, variable, and complex reality of
working with EU Structural Funds. A distinctive approach of the analysis is to disag-
gregate the stages of Structural Funds programme management and delivery, thereby
highlighting the varied nature of regional involvement in Structural Funds. Ultimately,
the paper questions the notion that Structural Funds build regional structures and
competence, and lead to `stronger regions'. Instead, it is argued that there is no guarantee
that the Structural Funds will necessarily promote the role of regional authorities or the
cause of regionalisation in the EU8, at least in the short to medium terms.
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Regional structures and Cohesion policy resources in the EU8 member states
Regional administrative arrangements
After the demise of state socialist regimes, the economic development policy priorities
of postcommunist governments were to undertake fundamental macroeconomic, politi-
cal, legal, and social reforms. Regional policy had a low priority, and there were few
national or regional institutions or policies to address regional development problems.
Specific measures for underdeveloped regions tended to be small scale and uncoordi-
nated, as in the Czech Republic and Hungary. Regional administrative structures
capable of delivering more regionally based, coordinated support programmes were
generally lacking, and small scale, local/municipal governments were the main form
of subnational administration. Due to their small size and limited revenue, many
municipalities had problems functioning effectively and mobilising sufficient political,
economic, and organisational resources to undertake meaningful development projects.
From the mid-1990s the negative impact of economic reformsönotably in heavily
industrialised, agricultural, and peripheral regionsöand EU accession requirements
encouraged the accession countries to draw up regional development concepts and
enact regional policy legislation (Bachtler et al, 2000; Blaz­ ek, 1999; Gorzelak, 1996;
Smith, 1994). The institutional infrastructure for regional policy also began to be
established, with the creation of regional development ministries or national agencies
and interdepartmental committees. However, central government administrations were
reluctant to decentralise powers and resources to regional levels of self-government;
regionalised budgets or initiatives tended to be administered by regional offices of
national ministries (Bachtler and Downes, 1999).
Since the late 1990s and early 2000s this situation has changed, with a growing
awareness that the regional institutions for delivering regional development policies
were inadequate. Several important steps have been taken to create frameworks for
regional-level economic development, with some common elements.
. Deconcentrated units of the state. The most common form of regionalisation
is the `deconcentration' of central government responsibilities to regional offices
of the state. Subnational offices of central government ministries operate in most
countries to implement sectoral policy measures, with varying powers and resources,
for example labour offices in the Czech Republic and Voivod offices in Poland.
. Regional development agencies. Among the first organisations to be established at
the regional level with a specific regional policy remit were regional development
agencies (eg the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia).
. Associations of municipalities. The local level has sought a greater role in shaping
or administering regional policy through cooperative or collaborative associations
of counties, districts, or municipalities, for example the Association of Estonian
Cities, the Union of Local and Regional Governments of Latvia, the Association
of Towns and Communities of Slovakia (ZMOS), the Union of Towns and Com-
munities of the Czech Republic (SMOCR), and the Slovenian Association of
Municipalities and Towns (ZRCALO).
. Planning regions. In complying with the EU requirements for creating territorial units
under the NUTS system, planning regions have been created in some countries at
NUTS II or III levels, for example in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia.
These planning regions have provided the basis for regional coordination mechanisms
to enable the participation of lower administrative tiers in identifying regional
development priorities.
. Self-governing regions. In a small number of countriesöthe Czech Republic,
Poland, and the Slovak Republicörecent reforms have created self-governing
regions which have facilitated greater levels of local/regional participation in the
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implementation of national regional policy and the development of their own regional
strategies.
This diverse set of regional institutions and frameworks demonstrates that the
scope for implementing EU Cohesion policy varies greatly. While the Polish NUTS II
level (voivodship/regions) forms a rational basis for regional Structural Funds pro-
grammes, in the Czech Republic the NUTS II c`ohesion regions' combine two or three
self-governing regions, and in Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the country as
a whole is a single NUTS II region (see table 1). Also, the financial, institutional, and
human resources available to the regional level have (to date) been comparatively limited,
even in those countries with self-governing regions (Blaz­ ek et al, 2003). Meanwhile, new
institutions set up by central governments at the regional level (such as regional develop-
ment agencies) have sometimes failed to establish credibility and trust among regional and
local actors (Pa¨lne¨ Kova¨cs, 2004). Indeed, Pa¨lne¨ Kova¨cs et al (2004) have argued that
`` concepts such as regionalisation or partnership have been used as tools for the re-central-
isation of the policy process and for resource distribution alongside clientele and clique
interests'' (page 457). This begs the question as to whether the regional-level bodies are
`regionally rooted', or whether they represent a pragmatic or artificial administrative
response to the regulatory requirements of EU Cohesion policy.
EU Cohesion policy programmes
For the 2004 ^ 06 period, a financial allocation of 24.5 billion for Structural and
Cohesion Funds in the period 2004 ^ 06 was agreed for the EU8 member states
(see table 2).(4) The EU8 agreed to implement most Structural Funds resources through
central government, sectoral policy programmes. Notable exceptions were the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland, which had some form of joint or integrated ROP.
In Slovakia the Operational Programme (OP) for Basic Infrastructure also incorpo-
rated a regional element. The resources allocated to these programmes were sometimes
Table 1. NUTS II regions and subnational authorities in the EU8 member states.
Country NUTS II regions Regional and local authorities
Czech Republic 8 14 regions
6 249 municipalities
Estonia 1 15 counties
241 municipalities
Hungary 7 19 counties
3 168 municipalities
Latvia 1 26 districts
7 larger cities
57 towns, 453 rural municipalities
19 amalgamated municipalities
Lithuania 1 10 counties
60 municipalities
Poland 16 16 regions
379 counties (including 65 city authorities)
2 478 communes
Slovakia 4 8 regions
50 districts
2 879 municipalities
Slovenia 1 28 administrative units
193 municipalities
(4) Out of forty-one NUTS II regions in the new member states, thirty-eight qualified for Objective 1
support. In the EU8 member states, only the regions of Prague and Bratislava had Objective 2 status.
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considerable; the 2004 ^ 06 ROPs in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland
accounted for 31%, 18.6%, and 40% of total national and EU funding, respectively.(5)
In the smaller countries regional development interventions generally made up one
priority (or even just one measure) of the country's Community Support Framework
(CSF) or Single Programming Document (SPD).
Notwithstanding commitments to the regionalisation of EU Cohesion policy
programmes, the degree to which regions have an influence depends on the nature of
their involvement at each stage in the process of drawing up national/regional develop-
ment plans, the negotiation of OPs, and the management and delivery of interventions. As
will be argued in the following sections, the roles of regional institutions in the various
stages have hitherto varied greatly, raising questions about the levels of regionalisation
and regional participation in Structural Funds programmes.
National and subnational involvement in Structural Funds
In theory, subnational participation in EU Cohesion policy programmes can involve
several functions (see figure 1). At the programme planning stage, subnational levels
may make an input to national programming documents through formal consultation.
In some cases regional administrations may coordinate the development of individual
OPs. Subnational bodies may participate in the management of `regional' elements
of programming documents or ROPs. Regional actors can take on key roles as
implementing bodies. Lastly, subnational authorities have a potential role as project
applicants and `beneficiaries' of programme spending.
The following sections examine each of the main stages in the programming
process in detail. The analysis focuses on developments in the 2004 ^ 06 programme
period, and offers a timely opportunity to look back and reflect on developments.
The analysis takes into account programming plans and guidelines, but since this only
gives a partial view, practical experience with programme management and delivery
in the EU8 is also assessed.(6)
Table 2. EU Cohesion policy allocations for the EU8 member states 2004 ^ 06 ( billion) (source:
European Commission, 2004).
Country Objective Interreg Equal Cohesion Total
1 2 3
Fund
Czech Republic 1 454.27 71.30 58.79 68.68 32.10 936.05 2 621.19
Estonia 371.36 0.00 0.00 10.60 4.07 309.03 695.06
Hungary 1 995.72 0.00 0.00 68.68 30.29 1 112.67 3 207.36
Latvia 625.57 0.00 0.00 15.26 8.03 515.43 1 164.29
Lithuania 895.17 0.00 0.00 22.49 11.87 608.17 1 537.70
Poland 8 275.81 0.00 0.00 221.36 133.93 4 178.60 12 809.70
Slovakia 1 041.04 37.17 44.94 41.47 22.27 570.50 1 757.39
Slovenia 237.51 0.00 0.00 23.65 6.44 188.71 456.31
Total 14 896.45 108.47 103.73 472.19 249.00 8 419.16 24 249.00
(5) Author calculations based on figures available from Inforegio, Structural Funds: eligible areas in
EU25 for Objective 1 and 2 between 2000 and 2006, http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional policy/
atlas/index en.htm
(6) Unless otherwise stated, the assessment of practical experience is based on fieldwork interviews
with senior officials of ministries of economics, finance, or regional development in each of the
EU8 member states, and a range of subnational authorities (particularly in the Czech Republic and
Poland) carried out during 2003, 2004, and 2005.
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Programme planning
The starting point for developing Structural Funds programmes is the national/regional
development planning stage. For the 2004 ^ 06 period this involved the EU8 member
states drawing up national development plans (setting out how they planned to spend
their allocations of EU Cohesion policy funding), conducting an independent ex ante
evaluation of the plans, and submitting the plans to the European Commission for
approval. Following negotiation with the Commission servicesöand in most cases
amendmentöthe plans were approved as CSFs (for the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, and Slovakia) or SPDs (for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia).
At this stage in the process, regions can be involved in different ways. At a minimum
they should be offered some formal consultation on member states' proposals. They
may also be represented on planning groups and, in some cases, given responsibility
for drafting regional planning or programme documents. Among some EU15 member
states (particularly federal states) they may take the lead in the programming process
and participate in the negotiations with the Commission services.
All EU8 member states made at least some attempts to involve subnational
organisations in the planning processes for the 2004 ^ 06 programmes. At a minimum,
Regional and local participation in the
development of national programmes
Programming documents developed
by regional institutions
Regions receiving resources from
the state to fund projects
Regions active in developing
projects and applying for funds
Planning Final beneficiary
Regional managing authorities
for programmes
Regional participation in
management committees
Regional responsibility for the
management of regional
interventions
Regional institutions and agencies
responsible for programme
implementation, including project
generation, selection, and
monitoring activities
Regional institutions responsible
for the implementation of
particular measures or schemes
Potential roles of regions
Management Implementation
Figure 1. The potential roles of regions in Structural Funds programmes.
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national authorities made available draft copies of programming documents to
subnational and nongovernmental organisations for comment. In Estonia the finance
ministry invited comments on the basic strategy and, later on, the full SPD; a quarter
of the partners responding to the second consultation were said to be municipalities
and county governments, with the Ida-Viru county and the Union of Estonian Associ-
ations of Local Authorities described as being among the most `` active'' respondents
(EMoF, 2003, page 17). Informal seminars were undertaken in each planning region
of Latvia, although these were described as informational rather than consultative
(LMoF, 2003). The most extensive regional participation in the programme planning
process was evident in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, where
individual ROPs were planned for the 2004 ^ 06 period and whichöinitiallyögave
regional administrations the scope to develop the structure and content of their `own'
programmes. In practice, however, the ROPs were abandoned in favour of joint or
integrated ROPs, which, in theory, were meant to reflect the combined development
agenda of all the regions.
These examples demonstrate that regions played a role in some aspects of pro-
gramme planning, to varying degrees. However, the extent of regional influence on the
major resource allocation decisions has to be seen in the context of traditionally
centralised and sectorally oriented policy making and weak, newly established regional
administrations or (in most countries) a lack of self-governing regions. In this context
it is arguable that the influence of regions in practice was limited, and the obstacles to
regional involvement were formidable, for several reasons.
First, the priority for national development programmes in the EU8 member states
was (and is) to promote convergence in national income and employment with the rest
of the EU. This was evident in the objectives specified for the 2004 ^ 06 Cohesion
policy programmes which gave primacy to accelerating national economic growth by
addressing major infrastructure deficits and promoting key economic sectors [for
example, Habuda (2004) for Hungary, and Vilkas (2004) for Lithuania]. Regional
development had a relatively small share of total EU funding, and much of its alloca-
tion was centrally determined, even in countries such as Poland which had regional
programmes (Gorzelak, 2004).
Second, the process of allocating Cohesion policy resources involves difficult stra-
tegic choices about the priorities given to economic, social, and environmental goals,
each of which is subject to strong political pressures and vested interests. Policy makers
need to manage the high expectations of a range of societal and political groups in
order to ensure the strategic coherence of Structural and Cohesion Funds programmes,
with consistency in interventions and clear targets (Davies and Gross, 2005). Ulti-
mately, it is central governments that need to arbitrate between competing interests
in deciding the allocation of funding. As Bailey (2006, pages 25 ^ 26) notes, there is a
tension between `` balancing the need for political inclusion with the control/exclusion
needed to uphold the authority of lead institutions and the efficient operation of the
market economy'' (pages 25 ^ 26). In this process regional authorities are just one of a
range of different groups seeking to influence the development debate, a challenge
which proved to be particularly difficult for regions lacking a directly elected regional
self-government tier in the 2004 ^ 06 planning process (for example in Estonia, Latvia
or Slovenia).
Third, the capacity of subnational structures to make an effective contribution to
programme planning has been repeatedly questioned, particularly in the smaller member
states (Bailey and De Propris, 2002; Ka¨lma¨n, 2002). In Latvia and Slovenia, for instance,
the lack of any regional level of self-government meant that subnational input was
uncoordinated, fragmented, and localised. In Slovakia, regions were only just being
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established as the 2004 ^ 06 programming documents were developed; newly formed
regional administrations (as in the Czech Republic) commonly lacked the technical
capacity, human resources, and experience to offer high-quality input into the planning
stage. In several countries the officials of coordinating government ministries claimed a
lack of interest, coordination, cooperation, and strategic thinking on the part of regions.
Fourth, the commitment of government ministries to encouraging regional par-
ticipation, and their own capacity to assimilate subnational input, was often weak.
Interview research on the preparations for the 2004 ^ 06 period found that consultation
was frequently perceived by subnational bodies to be formalistic and for information
purposes only. The perceived lack of central government commitment to engaging in
meaningful dialogue with the regions was attributed to the inexperience of government
ministries in consultative policy making, and a lack of effective channels of communi-
cation/cooperation between levels of government. Consultations were also sometimes
viewed as an obstacle to developing a coherent strategy, by adding more complexity to
an already complicated process. As a result, little value was attached to the process,
particularly where traditionally powerful ministries were reluctant to `give up' control
of the programming process.
Evidence from the ex ante evaluations of 2004 ^ 06 programming documents rein-
forces these findings. The Czech ex ante evaluation, for example, found that the
programme planning process was affected by poor vertical cooperation mechanisms
between national and regional levels (and also horizontally at each level) and a lack
of effective communication between central government departments responsible for
conceiving the policy or strategy and the implementing bodies at national and sub-
national levels (Blaz­ ek and Voza¨b, 2006). Similar problems with national ^ regional
cooperation were reported in the ex ante evaluation of Structural Funds planning
documents in Poland (Bafoil, 2002).
Overall, it can be concluded that the involvement of regions in programme plan-
ning was at best mixed. Subnational authorities participated to a limited extent in
consultations on the development of national programme plans, and a small number
of regions were able to draw up their own regional strategy documents. However, the
key decisions on programme development and resource allocation were taken by
central government authorities, even under ROPs.
Programme management and control
The management of EU Cohesion policy programmes is complex. At the apex of the
structure, during the 2004 ^ 06 period, member states were required to designate a
`managing authority' with overall responsibility for the assistance provided and for
ensuring compliance with the Council Regulations (relating to the planning and
management of programmes, monitoring of assistance, communication with beneficia-
ries, etc). They were also required to have: a `paying authority', to manage payment flows
between the Commission and beneficiary organisations; and a `monitoring committee',
comprising representatives of partner organisations, to oversee the implementation of
the programme.
The assignment of managing and paying authority responsibilities to government
departments was determined by the member states. During the 2004 ^ 06 period the
overall responsibility for EU Cohesion policy was allocated to ministries of finance
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), ministries for regional development (Czech Republic,
Poland, Slovak Republic), or government offices for regional/territorial development
(Hungary, Slovenia). In the smaller countries (Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia) most or
all the managing authority functions were handled solely by the ministries of finance.
In larger countries, with more EU funding, managing authority responsibilities were
EU cohesion policy and the role of the regions 11
spread among different government departments. For example, in the Czech Republic,
while the Ministry of Regional Development was the managing authority for the CSF
as a whole, management of the individual OPs was undertaken by sectoral ministries.
Similar arrangements applied in Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. By comparison, the
paying authority function was more restricted, being allocated to finance ministries in
all member states; in some cases `paying units' were established at OP level in other
ministries to receive payment requests and pay out funding.
Under EU regulations, some of the managing authority powers could be delegated
to so-called `intermediate bodies', primarily to ensure effective financial management
and control of expenditure. Most EU8 states took advantage of this provision, nomi-
nating the government bodies responsible for OPs or measures as intermediate bodies.
As table 3 illustrates, these were either: central government ministries, particularly in
the smaller countries; or state agencies, in the Czech Republic (eg CzechInvest, Czech
Trade), Hungary (eg National Employment Office), Poland (eg State Committee for
Scientific Research), and Slovakia (eg Slovak Energy Agency). In a few cases the
intermediate body functions were undertaken by the regional offices of the state,
notably the Voivod offices in Poland. In other cases, however, the regional involvement
was limited to the part management of the regional development OP, for example,
regional councils in the Czech Republic and marshal's offices in Poland.
Very little of the EU funding for the new member states was, therefore, managed or
controlled at regional level. As previously noted, several EU8 member states originally
had ambitious plans for regional management of 2004 ^ 06 OPs, as in Poland and the
Czech Republic. In Poland the draft ROPs were produced by the regional marshal's
offices and included analyses of the socioeconomic base of the region, a set of tailored
priorities and activities to be undertaken, and a description of the process of consulta-
tion, monitoring, and financial arrangements (Ferry, 2003a). Related, new and existing
offices made active preparations for their management role, and new, regionally based
frameworks were planned to play a more active role in steering economic development
on their own territory.
In practice, the Commission questioned the capacity of regional administrations to
cope with programme management responsibilities, and relatively few functions were
actually decentralised. Even programmes specifically targeting regional development
had central government ministries as their managing authoritiesöas in the cases of
the Ministry of Economy, Labour and Social Policy (Poland), Ministry for Regional
Development (Czech Republic), Ministry of Construction and Regional Development
(Slovakia), and the National Regional Development Office (Hungary). Despite opposi-
tion from the regional level (notably in Poland and the Czech Republic), plans for
ROPs were abandoned in favour of centrally managed, joint, or integrated ROPs
(ie multiregional programmes). In Poland, for example, the requirements of sixteen
regions, each with different socioeconomic characteristics and separate strategic prior-
ities, were integrated into a single ROP. Much of the potential regional value of the
programming processöin terms of implementing measures and disbursing Structural
Funds resources in line with regional prioritiesöwas therefore considered to be diluted
(Ferry and McMaster, 2003).
The main formal influence of subnational authorities on programme management
was through their membership of monitoring committees. These committees comprised
the managing and paying authorities, line ministries, intermediate bodies, implement-
ing bodies (see below), economic and social partners, nongovernmental organisations
and the European Commission (in an advisory capacity). As indicated in table 4, they
also included some representatives of regional and local authorities. In Poland the
regional state offices and the regional self-governments were represented on the CSF
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Table 3. Programme management and control responsibilities in the EU8 Structural Fund programmes, 2004 ^ 06. Source: authors' research from
Community Support Frameworks (CSFs), Single Programming Documents (SPDs), and Operational Programmes (OPs) for 2004 ^ 06; and interview research.
Country Managing authority Intermediate bodies
Czech Republic
CSF Ministry of Regional Development -
Joint Regional OP Ministry of Regional Development Centre for Regional Development and Regional Councils
OP Industry and Ministry Industry and Trade CzechInvest; Czech Energy Agency; Czech Trade; Czech-Moravian Guarantee
enterprise and Development Bank
OP Human Resources Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs Civic Society Development Foundation; Ministry for Education; Employment Agency
OP Infrastructure Ministry of the Environment Ministry of Transport; State Environmental Fund
OP Rural Development/ Ministry of the Environment State Agricultural Intervention Fund
Agriculture
Objective 2 Prague Ministry of Regional Development Centre for Regional Development (regional branch); Regional Council (Prague)
Objective 3 Prague Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs Employment Services Administration (MoLSA)
Prague City; Civic Society Development Foundation
Estonia Ministry of Finance Ministry of Social Affairs; Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications;
Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Internal Affairs;
Ministry of Environment; Ministry of Education and Research
Hungary
CSF National Development Office -
OP Regional Development National Regional Development Office National Agency for Regional Development; Regional Development Agencies; Hungarian
State Treasury
OP Economic Competitiveness Ministry of Economy and Transport Regional Development Holding Group Company; Hungarian Development Bank;
Hungarian Enterprise Promotion (PBC); Office for Research Fund Management
and Exploitation; IT Information Society (PBC); Hungarian State Treasury
OP Environment/ Ministry of Economy and Transport Ministry of Environment and Water; Energy Centre PBC; Hungarian State Treasury
Infrastructure
OP Human Resources Ministry of Employment and Labour National Employment Office; ESF National Implementing Agency; Ministry of
Education; Ministry of Health, Social and Family Affairs; Hungarian State Treasury
OP Agricultural/Rural Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Agricultural and Rural Development Agency; Ministry of Regional Development
Development Development and Local Governments (CFCU); Ministry of Welfare (State Employment Service);
Ministry of Agriculture (Rural Support Service)
Latvia Ministry of Finance Ministry of Regional Development and Local Governments (CFCU); Ministry of Welfare
(State Employment Service); Ministry of Agriculture (Rural Support Service)
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Table 3 (continued).
Country Managing authority Intermediate bodies
Lithuania Ministry of Finance Ministry of Economy; Ministry of Social Security and Labour; Ministry of Education
and Science; Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Environment; Ministry of Transport and
Communications; Ministry of Healthcare; Information Society Development Committee
Poland
CSF Ministry of Regional Development -
OP Economic Ministry of Regional Development State Committee for Scientific Research; Ministry of the Environment
Competitiveness
OP Human Resources Ministry of Regional Development Ministry of National Education and Sports
OP Food Sector and Rural Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Agency for Reconstruction and Modernisation of Agriculture; Foundation
Development Development for Assistance Programmes for Agriculture; Marshal’s Offices
OP Fisheries and Fish Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Agency for Reconstruction and Modernisation of Agriculture; Regional Sea
Processing Development Fishery Inspectorate
OP Transport—Maritime Ministry of Infrastructure General Directorate for National Roads and Motorways; Polish Railways
Economy
Integrated Regional OP Ministry of Regional Development (in Voivod Offices
cooperation with sixteen Voivodships)
Slovakia
CSF Ministry of Construction and Regional -
Development
OP Basic Infrastructure Ministry of Construction and Regional Ministry of Transport, Posts and Telecommunications; Ministry of Environment
Development
OP Human Resources Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs Ministry of Education; National Labour Office
and Family
OP Industry and Services Ministry of Economy National Agency for SME (small and medium-sized enterprises) Development; Slovak
Energy Agency (and its regional branches); Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency;
Slovak Tourism Agency
OP Agriculture and Rural Ministry of Agriculture Agricultural Paying Agency
Development
Objective 2 Bratislava Ministry of Construction and -
Regional Development
Objective 3 Bratislava Ministry of Labour, Social Ministry of Education
Affairs and Family
Slovenia Government Office for Structural Ministry of the Economy; Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs; Ministry of
Policies and Regional Development Agriculture, Forestry and Food
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Table 4. Programme implementation responsibilities in the EU8 Structural Fund programmes, 2004 ^ 06. Source: authors' research from Community Support
Frameworks (CSFs), Single Programming Documents (SPDs), and Operational Programmes (OPs) for 2004 ^ 06; interview research.
Country/Programme National implementing bodies Regional implementing bodies
Czech Republic
Joint Regional OP Centre for Regional Development; CzechInvest (measure 1.1); Regional Councils (7)
Ministry of Regional Development (5.2)
OP Industry and Enterprise CzechInvest (and regional offices); Czech Energy Agency; Regional Offices of CzechInvest [some located in Regional
Czech Trade; Czech-Moravian Guarantee and Development Bank Development Agencies]
OP Human Resources Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs; Ministry of Education, Regions represented on project selection committees of the
Youth and Sports; Ministry of Regional Development; Ministry implementing bodies
of Industry and Trade; Ministry of Environment
OP Infrastructure Association of Regions of the CR represented on implementation
Managing Committee and subcommittees for the OP. Kraj represented
on NUTS III Regional Working Groups for the environment sector
which are responsible for project generation and preparation
OP Rural Development/Agriculture Ministry of Agriculture Regional Division of State Intervention Fund
Objective 2 Prague Centre for Regional Development (through regional branch) Regional Council (Prague Municipal Assembly)
Objective 3 Prague Regional Council (Prague Municipal Assembly)
Estonia Relevant agencies of Ministry of Social Affairs; Ministry of
Economic Affairs and Communications; Ministry of Agriculture;
Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Internal Affairs; Ministry of
Environment; Ministry of Education and Research (eg Foundation
of Life-long Learning, Enterprise Estonia, Agricultural Registers
and Information Board)
Hungary
CSF
OP Regional Development National Agency for Regional Development RDAs
Regional Development Councils appoint experts as members of the
Project Selection Committee
OP Economic Competitiveness Regional Development Holding Group Co;
Hungarian Development Bank; Hungarian Enterprise Promotion Public
Benefit Company (PBC); Office for Research Fund Management and
Exploitation; IT Information Society PBC
OP Environment/Infrastructure Ministry of Environment and Water; Energy Centre PBC
OP Human Resources National Employment Office; ESF National Implementing Agency;
Ministry of Education; Ministry of Health, Social and Family Affairs
OP Agriculture/Rural Development Agricultural and Rural Development Agency
Latvia Ministry of Regional Development and Local Governments (CFCU); Steering Committees for the four Funds include representatives of the
Ministry of Welfare (State Employment Service); Ministry of Regional Development Agencies and Union of Local and Regional
Agriculture (Rural Support Service) Governments of Latvia
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Table 4 (continued).
Country/Programme National implementing bodies Regional implementing bodies
Lithuania Central Project Management Agency; Lithuanian Business Support
Agency; Transport Investment Directorate; Environment Implementing
Agency; Human Resource Development Programmes Support
Foundation; National Paying Agency
Poland
CSF
OP Economic Competitiveness Polish Agency for Enterprise Development; Industrial Development Regional Financing Institutions (some located in RDAs)
Agency; Ministry of Scientific Research and Information Technology;
National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management
OP Human Resources Ministry of Economy and Labour; Ministry of National Education Voivodship labour offices
and Sports; State Fund for Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons;
Polish Agency for Enterprise Development; Civil Service Office
OP Food Sector and Rural Agency for Reconstruction and Modernisation of Agriculture; -
Development Foundation for Assistance Programmes for Agriculture; Marshal’s Offices
OP Fisheries and Fish Processing Agency for Reconstruction and Modernisation of Agriculture supported -
by Fisheries Inspectorate
OP Transport –Maritime Economy Ministry of Transport -
Integrated Regional OP - Implementation of the Integrated ROP (IROP) is divided
between the Voivod Office and Marshal’s Office (the latter
being responsible for management of the regional component).
IROP regional component Steering Committee also includes
representatives of: district and community self-governments;
and socioeconomic partners from the area of the Voivodship.
Slovakia
CSF
OP Basic Infrastructure Ministry of Transport, Posts and Telecommunications; Local infrastructure measures to be implemented in close association
Ministry of Environment with regional self-governments
OP Human Resources Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family; District Labour Offices
Ministry of Education; National Labour Office
OP Industry and Services National Agency for SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) -
Development; Slovak Energy Agency (and its regional branches); Slovak
Investment and Trade Development Agency; Slovak Tourism Agency
OP Agriculture and Rural Development Agricultural Paying Agency -
Objective 2 Bratislava Ministry of Construction and Regional Development -
Objective 3 Bratislava Ministry of Education -
Slovenia Ministry of the Economy; Ministry of Labour, Family and -
Social Affairs; Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food
Note: Italics  involvement in project preparation or selection.
Monitoring Committee, while the Integrated ROP (IROP) also included representatives
of district and community self-governments and socioeconomic partners from within
the voivodships. Regions were also represented on monitoring committees in the Czech
Republic (through the regional councils), Hungary (regional development councils),
Slovakia (self-governing regions), and Latvia (regional development councils). Addi-
tionally, representatives of municipalities participated on the committees in some
countries, generally through groups such as the Union of Local and Regional Govern-
ments of Latvia, the Hungarian Association of Cities of County Rank, and the Slovak
Association of Towns and Municipalities.
While many of the monitoring committees had subnational representation, the
influence of regions/municipalities should not be overstated. Although monitoring
committees played an important, formal role in monitoring the implementation of
the EU programmes, the size, breadth, and diversity of committee membership, the
infrequent meetings (most met only two or three times a year), and the dense agenda
meant that much of the committee work involved administrative `rubber-stamping'
rather than active management.
Programme implementation
Under EU rules, programme managing authorities can delegate administration of
Structural Funds programmes to so-called `implementing bodies'. These are organisa-
tions with responsibility for organising project selection, advising applicants, processing
project applications, granting aid, receiving claims for payment, and monitoring project
implementation.
Among the EU8 member states the implementation functions for the 2004 ^ 06
programmes were undertaken mainly by national government organisations, such as
central government departments, development agencies, and sector organisations (see
table 5). The main difference between countries is where the line was drawn between
the management and implementation of programmes. For example, in the Czech
Republic, several agenciesösuch as CzechInvest and the Czech-Moravian Develop-
ment and Guarantee Banköwere entrusted with delegated responsibility both for
aspects of management/control (as intermediate bodies) and also for implementation
(as implementing bodies). By contrast, in Lithuania, government ministries retained all
aspects of management/control, but delegated implementation to agencies (eg the
Lithuanian Business Support Agency and the Environment Implementing Agency).
Subnational bodies were involved in programme implementation in most member
states, but with big differences between countries. The most extensive regional involve-
ment was under the IROP in Poland, where programme implementation was wholly
regionalised. In each region, implementation was divided between the Voivod office
(regional office of the state) and the marshal's office (regional self-government), with the
latter being responsible for managing the `regional component' of the IROP. In addition,
the steering committees set up to oversee the administration of the IROP regional
component included representatives of district and community self-governments and socio-
economic partners from the area of the voivodship. In the Czech Republic and Hungary
the implementation of the ROPs was undertaken by national organisationsömainly the
Centre for Regional Development for the Czech Joint ROP and the National Agency for
Regional Development for the Hungarian ROPöbut with region-level organisations also
given a role as implementing bodies (regional development agencies in Hungary).
Among other programmes there was much more limited subnational involvement,
and mainly through regional or local representation on implementation commit-
tees. For example, the steering committees for each of the four funds in Latvia
included representatives of the regional development agencies and the Union of Local
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Table 5. Regional representation on Monitoring Committees in the EU8 Structural Fund programmes, 2004 ^ 06. Source: authors' research from Community
Support Frameworks (CSFs), Single Programming Documents (SPDs), and Operational Programmes (OPs) for 2004 ^ 06; and interview research.
Country Regional representation
Czech Republic
CSF Regional Councils
Joint Regional OP (ROP) Regional Councils; Kraj (NUTS III); Regional Development Committees (monitoring subcommittees in the individual NUTS II regions)
OP Industry and Enterprise Regional Councils
OP Human Resources Regional Councils
OP Infrastructure ‘‘Delegated representative of regions’’
OP Rural Development/Agriculture -
Objective 2 Prague Regional Council (Prague Municipal Assembly)
Objective 3 Prague Regional Council (Prague Municipal Assembly)
Estonia ‘‘Representatives of regional authorities and local government unions’’
Hungary
CSF ‘‘Representatives of the Regions’’
OP Regional Development Regional Development Councils
OP Economic Competitiveness Regional Development Councils; Representatives of municipalities
OP Environment/Infrastructure Regional Development Councils; Representatives of municipalities
OP Human Resources Regional Development Councils; Association of Cities of County Rank
OP Agriculture/Rural Development Regional Development Councils
Latvia Regional Development Councils; Union of Local and Regional Governments of Latvia
Lithuania ‘‘Regional/local partners’’
Poland
CSF Regional State Offices (Voivod Convents); Regional Self-Governments (Voivodship Marshal Convents)
OP Economic Competitiveness Representative of Council of Marshals
OP Human Resources Representative of Voivodship Convents and Council of Marshals
OP Food Sector and Rural Development Representative of Voivodship Convents and Council of Marshals
OP Fisheries and Fish Processing -
OP Transport –Maritime Economy One representative of local government
Integrated Regional OP Voivods; Marshals; Representatives of: district and community self-governments; and socioeconomic partners from the area of the Voivodship.
Slovakia
CSF ‘‘Representation of the Self-Governing Regions’’
OP Basic Infrastructure ‘‘Representation of regional and local levels’’
OP Human Resources ‘‘Where appropriate regional representatives may be involved in Monitoring Committee meetings’’
OP Industry and Services Self-governing regions; Slovak Association of Towns and Municipalities
OP Agriculture and Rural Development ‘‘Principal regional partners’’
Objective 2 Bratislava Bratislava Self-Governing Region; Municipal Council of Bratislava; Association of Towns and Communities of the Slovak Republic;
Union of Towns and Communities
Objective 3 Bratislava ‘‘where appropriate ... regions which benefit from EU assistance provided ... might be invited to the Monitoring Committee meetings’’
Slovenia Subnational authorities represented by minister responsible for local authorities
and Regional Governments. Regional self-governments in Slovakia also had some
administrative responsibility for the local infrastructure measure under the Basic Infra-
structure OP (participating in calls for proposals, selecting projects, and participating
in monitoring and evaluation).
Notwithstanding such examples, the more general picture was one of state agencies
controlling the implementation process, particularly in the member states that did not
have regionally oriented programmes (eg Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia).
Even in countries with regional development programmes, much of the regional imple-
mentation was dominated by regional offices of ministries or state agencies, which has
proved controversial. For instance, the Czech government's decision to establish regional
offices of the Centre for Regional Development was viewed by some as `` an attempt to
establish another arm of the central state in the regions''.(7)
This centralised approach to Structural Funds implementation reflected a con-
cernöat EU and national levelsöabout the ability of government departments and
agencies to cope with the regulatory, administrative, and technical demands of imple-
menting programmes. Indeed, the experience of Structural Funds management in the
2004 ^ 06 period was characterised by numerous problems of institutional capacity.
These related partly to what NEI (2002) has termed a`dministrative absorption capac-
ity', most notably inadequacies in the creation of appropriate institutional frameworks,
building administrative skills, and ability within ministries and agencies, establishing the
requisite primary and secondary legislation and developing administrative tools (such as
manuals and guidance notes) and IT systems (Horvath and Maier, 2004). The responsive-
ness of the administrative culture is also regarded as critical. While Structural Funds
management requires rapid and flexible responses to emerging needs, the experience of
Hungary (like other EU8 countries) was that of an historically bureaucratic administra-
tionöan underdeveloped culture of accountability, risk-averse attitudes, and the lack of
a c`ustomer oriented delivery network' (Kondor, 2004). Research on the intermediate
bodies in Slovakia also found deficiencies in governance, management practices, financial
resources, service delivery, and the quality of human resources (Barker, 2005).
A second problematic dimension concerned `financial absorption capacity', relating to
the ability of ministries and agencies `` to co-finance EU-supported programmes, to plan
and guarantee these national contributions in multi-annual budgets, and to collect these
contributions from several partners (public and private) interested in a programme or
project'' (Horvath and Maier, 2004, page 7). The difficulties of absorbing (ie spending)
Structural Funds resources were indicated by European Commission figures showing
that while, by late 2005, the new member states had committed (awarded) 55 ^ 65% of
their funds to projects, only 17% had actually been spent.(8)
It is important to note that the higher level doubts about administrative capacity
were shared at regional level; some regions were concerned from the start about their
ability to cope with programme management and implementation, owing to a lack of
resources and their awareness of the complexities and demands of the responsibilities
and tasks.(9) Deficiencies in institutional capacity,(10) lack of financial resources, and
(7) Author interviewöSdruz­ en|¨ pro rozvoj Moravskoslezske¨ho kraje (Union for the Development
of the Moravia-Silesia Region), Ostrava, March 2003 and Agentura pro regiona¨ln|¨ Rozvoje Ostrava,
March 2003.
(8) Figures from DG REGIO, European Commission, 18 November 2005.
(9) Author interview, Prague, 2003.
(10) The labour-intensive nature of Structural Funds administration can be illustrated by the number
of staff involved in administering the five Czech OPs: the managing authorities and intermediate
bodies employed 701 staff in 2004 (European Commission, 2006). This figure would increase
substantially if the paying authority staff (and paying units), and all the staff involved in implementing
bodies and financial beneficiary organisations, were to be included.
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weak coordination among regional organisations were perceived as severe limitations
(Grosse, 2004). In the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia, inadequate resources
constrained the ability of self-governing regions to fund development initiatives. Polish
regional self-governments found it difficult to hire new personnel due to budget limita-
tions, and they also suffered from the politicisation (rather than professionalisation) of
staff; a change of administration after elections was frequently followed by a major
turnover of staff. In all of the EU8 member states low public sector pay contributed to
high levels of staff turnover at every level of government.
In summary, therefore, the involvement of the regional level in the administration
of Structural Funds programmes was extremely weak during the 2004-06 period. In the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, subnational authorities did exercise some
control over some EU-funded interventions. However, these activities only made up a
small part of programme funding in each country. Government ministries and state
agencies dominated this aspect of the programme cycle, particularly in Estonia,
Lithuania, Latvia, and Slovenia. Additionally, the implementation of sectoral opera-
tion programmes involved very little input from regional administrations. A lack of
resources and limited experience of some regional institutions were constraints on the
regional level playing a greater role.
Project implementation
The final level of Structural Funds administration is the individual `project' or `action'
where the priorities and measures of EU programmes are put into practice. Applicant
organisations put forward proposals for funding to the implementing bodies; these may
be applications for individual projects (for example, the construction of new infra-
structure or a technology centre) or for actions such as grant schemes to support
SMEs or individuals. It is at this stage that the role of subnational institutions and
actors is strongest, as they have a key role in submitting project applications in order
to benefit from the Funds. Many programme priorities and measures list regions and
subnational administrations as their `final beneficiaries'.(11)
The experience of the EU8 in the 2004 ^ 06 period was that, despite early concerns
of low take-up, the application rates from subnational organisations was high. The
European Commission's first comprehensive assessment was that: `` initial experiences
indicate that the interest of beneficiaries has exceeded expectations'' (European Com-
mission, 2006). By the end of 2004 commitment levels were in the range 24 ^ 53%; these
figures increased to 55 ^ 65% by the end of 2005 and were close to 100% in most
countries by mid-2006.(12)
In the lead-up to accession, national governments and the European Commission
undertook a range of actions to support and generate projects, many of which were
targeted at the subnational level. For instance, in the Czech Republic, the so-called
Absorption Capacity (ABCAP) project was undertaken in 2003 ^ 04 to help the own-
ers/guarantors of projects to prepare project applications. In total, 770 successful
projects and schemes were assisted (ECR, 2004). In Hungary preparatory project
support activities included an information centre (providing generic information)
and a training centre (providing training for organisations involved in Structural
Funds management and implementation). Regionally based specialist consultancy
companies also played a part in helping potential beneficiaries to develop their project
(11) A `final beneficiary' is a public body, private firm, or social group which is allocated EU
programme support to carry out a project or action. In the case of aid schemes, the final
beneficiaries are the bodies which grant the aid to firms etc (which are the ultimate recipients).
(12) Figures provided by DG REGIO, European Commission. However, as noted earlier, the perfor-
mance on commitments was not matched with respect to payments, which were very slow at first.
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submissions (eg in the Czech Republic and Estonia), although their services could be
costly, of variable quality, and with limited accessibility. For example, in Estonia,
advisory centres tended to be concentrated in areas where project submission rates
were already high, around Tallinn and Tartu.
However, high application rates and strong regional involvement were not univer-
sal. The number and quality of applications differed considerably between regions. For
example, in Latvia, relatively few project applications were received for projects in
Latgale, the poorest region in the EU. In Estonia stronger municipalities were found
to be more likely to have the financial and human resources to develop better project
proposals. In other cases, some `lagging' regions, with long-standing experience of EU
support through preaccession aid, appeared to be well placed for developing more
innovative and robust project submissions, for example, Moravia-Silesia region in the
Czech Republic, or Silesia in Poland.
More generally, region-level bodies made far fewer applications than local orga-
nisations. Figure 2 illustrates the different levels of participation between regional
and local levels in Structural Funds project proposals in the Moravia-Silesia region.
A similar pattern was apparent in other Czech regions, in Poland (Ochojski, 2003), and
in Hungary.(13) In the smaller member states the `administrative gap' at regional level
meant that municipalities had an even greater role to play in drawing down EU funds
by submitting project applications.
A major obstacle to regional involvement was a lack of financial resources at
regional level for cofinancing EU-funded projects. In Poland it has been argued that
the capacity of regional governments to fund projects was constrained by insufficient
funding from central government, combined with inadequate tax-raising powers to
generate their own resources (Ferry, 2007). In Hungary, particular concerns were
expressed about the capacity of economically weak regions to cofinance projects. In
the Czech Republic, self-governing regions depended on funding allocated to them by
central government. In fact, the pressure that cofinancing placed on regional budgets
could actually limit the capacity of regional administrations to initiate autonomous or
independent interventions, as their spending programmes would be tied to Structural
Funds programmes.
In contrast, municipalities and cities were generally better resourced to provide
cofinancing for small-scale, local regeneration projects (Ferry and McMaster, 2005).
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Figure 2. Structural Funds project proposals in the Moravia-Silesia region (source: ECORYS,
2003).
(13) Author interview, National Regional Development Office, Budapest, April 2006.
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For instance, in Poland and the Czech Republic the fiscal powers of municipalities
meant that they could raise and disburse funds, putting them in a stronger financial
position in terms of cofinancing initiatives.(14) However, the small size of municipalities
meant that projects suffered from fragmentation, restricted scope/imagination, and, at
times, limited viability. Additionally, linked to constraints on capacity and resources,
large numbers of projects tended to focus on physical investment in `tried and tested'
areas of activity, possibly at the expense of `softer' or more `innovative' measures.
In summary, it is as project developers and final recipients of Structural Funds that
subnational authorities played their most important roles. However, lack of capacity
and resources meant that regional administrations tended to play a less active role
than municipal authorities, which tend to be longer standing institutions and better
resourced.
Regionalisation in 2007 ^ 13
As a new generation of programmes for the 2007 ^ 13 period is launched, the role of
regional administrations in the management and implementation of Structural Funds
could change. The basic principles of EU Cohesion policy have been retained in the
new Council regulations (Council of the European Union, 2006), but with a stronger
obligation on member states to ensure that the design and implementation of Struc-
tural Funds programmes is undertaken in partnership with subnational authorities.
How this is interpreted in practice in the EU8 member states will become clear over
the next seven years, although some initial insights are provided by the National
Strategic Reference Frameworks (NSRFs) drawn up by each member state as a basis
for Cohesion policy spending in the 2007 ^ 13 period.
The NSRFs and OPs indicate a considerable regionalisation of EU funding in the
four larger EU8 member states (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia). Under
the 2007 ^ 13 programmes preferential support is being provided for weaker or lagging
regions, through the financial allocations made to regions (Poland), through `reserved
resources' in each of the OPs (Czech Republic), or through project selection criteria at
priority level (Slovakia). Also, the use of multiregional operational programmes is
being replaced by region-specific programmes: sixteen for each of the voivodships
in Poland; seven in Hungary; eight in the Czech Republic; and eight in Slovakia.
The implications for governance are most significant in Poland where the role of
managing authority for the ROPs is passing from the Ministry of Regional Develop-
ment to the self-governing regions and their executive bodies, the marshal's offices,
although crucial paying authority and certification functions will be retained by central
government and the regional offices of the state. Similarly, in the Czech Republic and
Hungary the regional councils will take on managing authority responsibility for the
ROPs. Some of the smaller countries, for example, Slovenia and Latvia, are also taking
steps to engage subnational authorities in the delivery of the 2007 ^ 13 programmes,
albeit more with respect to implementation than management.
The devolution of management of responsibility for the ROPs is an important step
towards giving regions greater control of EU Cohesion policy, with potential implica-
tions for further decentralisation of economic development in the future. However,
there are some important caveats. First, the regionalised programmes represent only
a part of the overall EU Cohesion policy funding. Whereas the Polish regions will
manage some 29% of the Structural and Cohesion Funds, in Hungary the ROPs
will account for 24%, and in the Czech Republic only 13%.
(14) Author interview, Charles University, January 2003 and Moravia-Silesia, Kraj Department of
Regional Development, Ostrava, March 2003.
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Second, the `parallel structures' of regionalised ROP management and centralised
control of payments are a source of central-regional tensions. In Poland central govern-
ment is seeking to impose consistency of implementation across all regions (for exam-
ple with respect to project selection procedures), while the regions advocate
implementation arrangements to suit regional circumstances.
Third, the limited resources of regional self-governments constrain their ability to
undertake their own regional development projects with EU funds and make them
reliant on funding from other sources (municipalities, regional offices of the state,
NGOs, etc). The management responsibilities also present organisational and person-
nel challenges, most notably coordination across departments and the recruitment of
sufficiently qualified staff.
Fourth, regionalisation is associated with more complex administration. In some
of the larger member states the OPs had thirty to forty implementing bodies in
the 2004 ^ 06 period (Sí ump|¨kova¨ et al, 2004); the administrative arrangements for the
Czech and Polish joint ROPs were criticised in evaluation reports as being particularly
complex (McMaster and Bachtler, 2004). The creation of ROPs for the 2007 ^ 13
programmes is adding an additional `regional layer' of implementation, as the regions
establish their own implementing bodies.
Lastly, regions may find it difficult to achieve some of the strategic objectives of
their ROPs. The experience of the 2004 ^ 06 period was that implementing bodies were
ill prepared for the task of actively promoting economic and social development
(McClements and Smolkova, 2004). It was not uncommon for implementing agencies
to uphold `traditional' or c`ompartmentalised' approaches, by limiting themselves to
purely administrative activities or well-established areas of activity. Given the concerns
about the capacity and relative inexperience of regional institutions, their ability to
take on a more strategic role could be limited. At the same time, taking responsibilities
away from existing agencies reduces the scope to build on past experience.
Conclusions
In this paper we set out to examine the assumption that EU Structural Funds lead to
`stronger regions' EU8 member states, by building regional structures and competence,
and also the assumption that this is a particular `strength' of the funds. Parts of the
contemporary literature have suggested that the actual or potential influence of EU
Structural Funds on regional governance structures and policy practice is particularly
pronounced in the EU8 member states, with the result that regions (will) have an
important role to play in the development and delivery of Structural Funds pro-
grammes. These arguments are situated within the new regionalism debates on the
importance of regional and local actors engaging with, and advancing, economic
development agendas, and the influence of the EU on regional institutional development.
The scope for Structural Funds to develop the role of regions and encourage
bottom-up, regional involvement in promoting economic development is based on
several factors, linked to legitimacy, institution building, and capacity development.
This paper's analysis of the practical experience of managing and implementing
Structural Funds in 2004 ^ 06, and plans for the 2007 ^ 13 period, as opposed to
developments in the preaccession period, identifies several points to support the con-
tention that the role of regions has increased in terms of their legitimacy, institutional
stability, and capacity (see table 6).
In the past, regional involvement in economic development policies was extremely
limited, as programmes were largely centrally controlled and sectorally oriented. By
contrast, at the planning stage for EU programmes, specific provisions were made:
to involve regions either in the development of national development programmes or in
EU cohesion policy and the role of the regions 23
programmes specifically targeting regional development concerns; and to increase the
legitimacy of the programmes through partnership working. The Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland have encouraged regional institutions to build their own capacity
and take charge of developingöand subsequently managingönew regional programmes
for the 2007 ^ 13 programming period. An increasingly stable framework of regional
institutions, including regional development agencies, regional self-governments, and
specially formed regional councils, are responsible for the regional implementation of
some components of Structural Funds programmes, by generating, selecting, and
monitoring projects. Lastly, as final beneficiaries of the funds, regional institutions
play a critical role, since it is by drawing down resources and undertaking projects
that Structural Funds have the greatest impact on the ground. It is at this stage that the
input of subnational institutions is particularly strong.
This evidence appears to reinforce the contention that EU Structural Funds support
regional institutions, strengthening their previously weak position in the development
and delivery of regional policy. Their participation first in Phare accession projects and
now in Structural Funds programmes is encouraging a more `bottom-up', regionally
based approach to intervention. The combination of greater capacity, resources, and
experience gives the regions the opportunity to establish themselves as important actors
in the field of regional development, not least through the tendency of regions to
compete with each other to secure economic and institutional advantage.(15)
However, as this paper's analysis has also illustrated, the limitations and barriers
to regional participation in the funds currently outweigh the opportunities. In fact,
it is possible to question whether Structural Funds have led to `stronger regions',
Table 6. Roles of central and subnational levels in the EU8 2004 ^ 06 Structural Funds
programmes.
Structural Funds Roles of central and subnational levels
programme
central government subnational authoritiesfunctions
Planning Strong: ministries largely Mixed: some regional and local
responsible for programme consultative input. Regional
development, including strategies sometimes formed the
coordination of joint Regional basis for joint ROPs
Operation Programmes (ROPs)
Management Strong: ministries and agencies Weak: very limited management
fulfilled Managing Authority role, mainly through representation
and Intermediate Body functions on Monitoring Committees
Programme Strong: ministries and agencies Mixed: some implementation
implementation had lead role as implementing through regional offices of
bodies ministries and agencies. Regional
and local bodies responsible for
some joint ROP priorities or
measures or represented on
project selection committees.
Project Mixed: ministries and agencies Strong/mixed: local authorities
implementation were are generally responsible only were very active in implementing
for implementing large projects as final beneficiaries.
infrastructure projects. Regional authority participation
was more variable.
(15) The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for making this point.
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by contributing to the development of legitimacy, institutional framework, and capacity
at regional level.
The relative novelty of regional administrations in many EU8 member states, and
their limited experience of Structural Funds, mean that there has been a little time for
member states and regions to adapt and take on new responsibilities. Organisational
arrangements will change in the future, as regional institutional frameworks stabilise
and their experience grows. However, it is also possible to highlight a number of
`barriers' to regional participation that are firmly rooted in distinctive national policy
approaches and strategic decisions involved in the management and implementation of
Structural Funds.
First, as previous studies have highlighted, the role of regions in Structural Funds
programmes has to be set against a context of the limited influence of the EU in some
policy areas, relative to national governments. As Laffan (2004) and Blom-Hansen
(2005) note, EU legislation does not compel the member states to decentralise deci-
sions to regions and municipalities. In practice, the degree of subnational involvement
depends on constitutional arrangements, the institutional structures of individual
countries, and the size of the country.
As discussed above, not all of the EU8 member states have regional institutional
structures that are capable of participating in Structural Funds programmes. Questions
can be raised about the capacity of regional institutions to deal with the scale and type
of issues that the EU8 regions are facing. Where dedicated institutional frameworks
have been set up in connection with Structural Funds one can ask how `regionally
rooted' these institutions are, and how effective they are likely to be. Are they `real'
regionally based institutions, or pragmatic responses to the administrative demands of
Structural Funds? The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the latter applies,
confirming the argument of Pa¨lne¨ Kova¨cs et al (2004) that `top-down' regionalisation
(in the Hungarian context) has not fundamentally changed the territorial division of
power.
In practice, the participation of regional institutions varies considerably between
the EU8, as institutional legacies and domestic policy preferences have shaped the
responses of domestic policy actors and institutions. In countries with weak or non-
existent regional administrative structures, centralised sectoral policy making was
adopted as a more robust platform from which to develop and deliver EU pro-
grammes. Complicating the situation further, where the EU did exert an influence it
was not necessarily consistent. In the member states where an early commitment was
made to regional Structural Funds programmes for the 2004 ^ 06 period, guidance
from the European Commission led to the abandonment of those plans, in favour of
joint programmes. As Hughes et al (2004) note, in this respect, the position of the EU
and its guidelines have been unclear and even inconsistent.
Taking into account the `technical detail' of the Structural Funds also raises
important questions about the current scope of regional participation in the development
and delivery of the funds. As indicated earlier, in the EU8 member states regional
Structural Funds programmes are only one aspect of the support provided. Explicitly
`regional' interventions make up a small proportion of the resources.
Second, this paper's detailed assessment of each stage of the Structural Funds
implementation process reveals numerous limitations to regional participation. In
many member states government ministries dominate the planning stages of the
Structural Funds programming cycle. The capacity of regional institutions to feed
effectively into programme planning has been doubtful, compounded by a lack of
capacity at the regional level and a lack of commitment to enabling regional input at
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national level. Additionally, commitment to regional participation in principle is not
necessarily followed through in practice.
Once the programmes were agreed, regions could take on an important role in
managing programmes or element of the programmes. However, regional institutions
have hitherto only been involved in the management of a limited number of pro-
grammes and interventions. The extent to which regions will have a substantial role
in the future is still open for debate, with some regions expressing doubts over their
ability to cope with the volume of work involved. Even in countries with comparatively
well-established regions, the administration of highly complex EU funds could easily
overload regional administrations, undermining what authority they have. Because of
the complexity and administrative burden involved in the Structural Funds, there could
be `voluntary exclusion' on the part of the regions. At the very least, there is a c`apacity
issue'.
In comparison to their involvement in the management of EU programmes, the
involvement of regions in the implementation of the programmes is stronger. However,
state agencies still play a dominant role, often at the expense of regional institutions.
As previously noted, it is as final beneficiaries of the funds that subnational institutions
have had their greatest involvement. Even in this case, there are caveats. Very often
it is municipal authorities, as opposed to regional institutions, that are most actively
involved in applying for funding. Also, the quality and quantity of the projects vary
considerably across countries and regions. A further obstacle to regional participation
is a perceived lack of funds to cofinance projects.
Third, and perhaps controversially, it can be argued that there is a conflict between
regionalisation and effective Structural Funds management. This is the thesis of Pa¨lne¨
Kova¨cs (2005) who regards the implementation of Structural Funds in Hungary as a
`` shock to the `regionalists' '' given that successful implementation of the funds depends
less on directly regional government than professional management. Marinov et al
(2006) elaborate on this argument (page 6): ``decentralization and capacity building
to absorb post-accession funding need not go hand-in-hand ... centralized structural
fund programming and management may be needed to ensure the effective implemen-
tation of priority programmes.'' The massive increase of Cohesion policy funding for
the EU8 member states agreed for the 2007 ^ 13 period is requiring huge investment in
institutional capacity to ensure efficient and effective management, with the priority
being to ensure sound financial management and control. In these circumstances,
regionalisation may continue to be limited to the regional development OPs or to
specific priorities and measures.
These points challenge the notion that Structural Funds lead to `stronger regions'
and build regional structures and competence. Instead, the paper argues that there is
no guarantee that the Structural Funds will necessarily promote the role of regional
authorities or regionalisation. Looking to the future, as Baun and Marek (2006) note
with reference to the Czech case, there is the possibility for greater regionalisation.
However, they go on to point out that a key determinant of the influence of regions will
be the ability of the regional governments to `` wrest greater control in the management
and use of EU Structural Funds from the central government'' (Baun and Marek,
2006, page 425). So far, EU Structural Funds have not automatically ensured a strong
role for regions and regionally based development initiatives. However, in a situation of
scarce domestic funding for regional policy interventions, weak regional institutional
capacity, and limited financial resources, decisions on the future direction, content, and
frameworks for Structural Funds could have a substantial impact, by either reinforcing
centrally controlled policy making or supporting regional engagement in develop-
ment initiatives. Alternatively, if few changes are made to the current arrangements,
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an extremely mixed, and at times confused, picture of regional participation in Structural
Funds is likely to persist.
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